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ENDANGERED SPEc1ES PROTECTION: A HISTORY OF 
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
By William D. Palmer* 
INTRODUCTION 
The slogan "Extinct is forever"l emphasizes the unique and seri-
ous nature of the problem facing the world's endangered species. 
Unlike some problems which can be remedied once the damage 
becomes intolerable, the process of extinction is irreversible. Once 
a species vanishes, it can never be brought back. The loss is not 
merely aesthetic. Scientific,2 economic,3 and ethica14 problems are 
also involved. 
Man cannot claim disinterest in the process since his presence has 
increased the rate of animal extinction one-thousandfold.5 The rate 
of increase has been particularly drastic during recent years due to 
the development of a modern technological society.8 
The United States has been a major contributor to the problem. 
Between the years 1600 and 1850, only five domestic species became 
extinct.7 By contrast, fifty-seven such species have become extinct 
since 1850.8 This twenty-two fold increase in the rate of extinction 
in the United States has been countered by Congressional passage 
of four major legislative acts which have been utilized to protect the 
welfare of endangered species: The Lacey Act,9 the Endangered 
Species Preservation Act of 196610 (hereinafter cited as the 1966 
Act), the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 196911 (herein-
after cited as the 1969 Act), and the Endangered Species Protection 
Act of 197312 (hereinafter cited as the 1973 Act). All of these acts 
deal with the problems of endangered species in general, as opposed 
to several other laws which deal with a specific group of endangered 
species.13 
This article will discuss the four acts mentioned above, focusing 
in each case on (1) its basic provisions, (2) its approach to the 
problem of endangered species, (3) its judicial construction, and (4) 
its effectiveness and deficiencies. Primary emphasis will be placed 
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on the Lacey Act and the 1973 Act, both of which are still fully in 
effect, and on the sections of the 1966 Act which have not been 
superseded by the 1973 Act. Administrative difficulties in the im-
plementation of the 1973 Act will be discussed, and possible solu-
tions to these difficulties will be suggested. 
I. THE LACEY ACT 
A. Provisions of the Act 
The Lacey Act, as originally passed in 1900, contained a provision 
prohibiting the transportation in interstate commerce of animals 
killed in violation of state law.14 In 1935, the law was expanded to 
prohibit the interstate transportation of animals taken in violation 
of foreign laws. 15 This provision of the Act contributes significantly 
to the protection of endangered species. State and foreign laws 
which provide such protection are supplemented by federal penal-
ties and enforcement, if the animals or their by-products are moved 
in interstate commerce.18 The potential violator must either expose 
himself to additional federal liability by moving his illegally taken 
goods in interstate commerce, or choose to remain in one state, 
subject only to local enforcement. If he decides to remain in only one 
state, he will considerably restrict the available market for his 
goods, thereby reducing the demand to be filled and lessening the 
incentive for further violations of the law. The major deficiency of 
this provision is that its effectiveness is dependent upon the exist-
ence of adequate state and foreign laws for the protection of endan-
gered species. 
Other provisions of the Lacey Act may also be used to deter ani-
mal extinction, but to a lesser extent. As originally enacted, the law 
required that a permit be obtained from the Department of Agricul-
ture before any wild animal or bird could be imported into the 
United States. 17 This permit system was dropped in 1949, since no 
discretion had been given to the Secretary of Agriculture for issuing 
or denying such permits. IS The result of this lack of agency discre-
tion was a compilation of statistics on wildlife importation. but no 
control over it, since no permits were ever refused. IS Since no admin-
istrative adjudication ever occurred under this provision, no judicial 
construction or review of the section was possible. In place of the 
originally extensive permit system, a more limited system was es-
tablished. The new system required that a permit be obtained be-
fore importation of an animal which the Department of Agriculture 
had declared to be "injurious to the interests of agriculture or horti-
culture."20 Importation was permitted for zoological, educational, 
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medical, and scientific purposes, following a proper showing of re-
sponsibility and continued protection of the public interest and 
health.2t In addition, exemptions were provided for federal agen-
cies,22 dead natural-history specimens for museums or for scientific 
collection,23 and for certain species of cage birds.24 
The regulation of "injurious" wildlife under this section might 
contribute to the protection of endangered species, if animals listed 
as "injurious" also happened to be endangered. The importation of 
such animals would be subject to government regulation through 
the permit system. If as a result of the establishment of such a 
regulation such animals were excluded from the country, or allowed 
to be imported in fewer numbers, the market demand for such ani-
mals would decrease, and fewer animals would have to be removed 
from the wild to meet that demand.25 However, it is clear that the 
intent of the Lacey Act prohibition was to prevent the entry into the 
country of "pests" which could directly affect crops, and to avoid 
the establishment of populations of injurious wildlife in the ecosys-
tem.28 It was not aimed at any injuries which might result indirectly 
from the failure to protect or regulate an endangered species.27 Thus 
any benefit to endangered species stemming from this section is 
purely incidental-indeed, unintended. 
One additional section of the Lacey Act may be used to protect 
endangered species, although to a far lesser extent than other sec-
tions already discussed. In 1949, the Lacey Act was amended to 
require that wild birds and animals be shipped under humane con-
ditions.28 This section may protect individual members of an endan-
gered species, which might otherwise perish due to poor shipping 
conditions. However, the overall beneficial effect of this require-
ment is miniscule, since inadequate shipping conditions are not 
normally a major factor contributing to species extinction.29 The 
legislative history of this section indicates that Congress was pri-
marily concerned with situations where a large percentage of ani-
mals within a given shipment died during transport, rather than 
with the loss of a very small number of animals, even though they 
were endangered animals.30 
B. Judicial Construction 
Enactment of the Lacey Act raised questions concerning the ex-
tent to which states could pass laws protecting wildlife without 
conflicting with the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.3t 
It has been recognized that a police measure otherwise within the 
constitutional power of the state will not be held unconstitutional 
258 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
under the Commerce Clause because it incidentally and remotely 
affects interstate commerce.32 In Geer v. Connecticut,33 the regula-
tion of game was recognized as part of a state's police power: "The 
right to preserve game flows from the undoubted existence, in the 
State, of a police power to that end, which may be none the less 
efficiently called into play, because, by doing so, interstate com-
merce may be remotely and indirectly affected."34 In People v. 
Bootman35 (hereinafter cited as Bootman), the New York Court of 
Appeals held that: 
The action of Congress [passage of the Lacey Act] has taken away all 
questions of interstate commerce, so that the state can act with entire 
freedom and can prevent the shipment of game into or out of its own 
territory; and if game is imported, it can regulate or prohibit the sale 
thereof. Such provisions are warranted by the police power, and are not 
in conflict with either the state or Federal Constitution." 
A number of other cases have also concluded that the Lacey Act 
expanded the power of the states to regulate transportation of ani-
mals, rather than preempting the field and removing that power 
from the states.37 
Although the Lacey Act was recognized as early as 1910 as an act 
designed to protect endangered species,38 it suffers from a major 
deficiency in that it is dependent upon local and foreign laws for its 
usefulness, rather than embodying a substantive federal program 
designed to insme the conservation of endangered species. Such a 
program was not established until the 1966 Act was passed. 
II. THE 1966 ACT 
The 1966 Act has been described as " ... the first United States 
domestic law exclusively concerned with the welfare of all endan-
gered species. "38 
In passing the 1966 Act, Congress recognized four causes of extinc-
tion: habitat destruction, exploitation, disease, and predation.40 Al-
though mentioning all of these causes, the legislation specifically 
addresses only the problem of habitat destruction, and then only 
with respect to native wildlife. 
A. Provisions of the Act 
Section 1 of the Act declared that its purposes were to: 
. . . provide a program for the conservation, protection, restoration, and 
propagation of selected species of native fish and wildlife, including 
migratory birds, that are threatened with extinction, and to consolidate, 
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restate, and modify the present authorities relating to administration by 
the Secretary of the Interior of the National Wildlife Refuge System.41 
Section 2a directed the Secretary to use his previously authorized 
land acquisition authority to effectuate the purposes of the Act 
stated in Section 1.42 The Secretary was therefore specifically re-
quired to give cognizance to the endangered species problem for the 
first time. 
Section 2b authorized the purchase or donation of land not cov-
ered by previous acts to ". . . carry out the purposes of this Act. "43 
Thus the 1966 Act expanded the Federal government's role in the 
protection of endangered species from merely one of criminal en-
forcement actions to one of policy consideration during implementa-
tion of programs and financial assistance aimed directly at the prob-
lem of vanishing species. 
These initial sections deal exclusively with problems relating to 
the destruction of habitat, which was recognized at the time of 
enactment as a primary cause of extinction. 44 Subsequent legislative 
history of related acts confirms that habitat destruction is still con-
sidered a foremost factor in animal extinction.45 
Section 2d was the one section of the Act which could have been 
used to attack the other causes of extinction previously mentioned. 
That section directed the Secretary of the Interior to utilize pro-
grams under his control in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, 
as well as to encourage other federal agencies to do the same.48 
Although the enumerated causes of extinction are not directly ad-
dressed by this section, the wording was drafted in sufficiently gen-
eral terms so as to allow action to be taken pursuant to it which 
would relate to these other causes. An argument can be made that 
the vagueness of the section, combined with the overall emphasis 
of the statute on habitat preservation, indicates that the real impact 
of the section was only on programs which might affect habitat. This 
construction, however, is not confirmed by the legislative history of 
the Act, which refers to programs designed to conserve both the 
species and their habitat. 47 Section 2d provided no specific guide-
lines on how such programs could be implemented to further the 
purposes of the Act. Since the legislation concentrated primarily on 
land acquisition and protection, no clear-cut standards were estab-
lished for attacking the other causes of extinction mentioned. 
Section 4 of the 1966 Act is the only section which is still in effect, 
the other sections having been superseded by the 1973 Act. Section 
4a established a National Wildlife Refuge System (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the System), which consists of all land areas adminis-
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tered by the Secretary of the Interior for conservation of fish and 
wildlife. 48 
Section 4b relates to the administration of the System, authoriz-
ing the Secretary to accept donations of funds for use in acquiring 
and managing such lands,49 and also " . . . to acquire lands or 
interests therein by exchange for acquired lands or public lands 
under his jurisdiction which he finds suitable for disposition. "50 
Section 4c is the only section of the Act which contains any spe-
cific prohibitions, rather than requiring affirmative actions to be 
taken for the protection of endangered species. Forbidden activities 
include: (1) disturbing, injuring, cutting, burning, removing, de-
stroying, or possessing any property of the United States within the 
System;51 (2) taking or possessing any animal or its parts, nests, or 
eggs from within the System;52 and (3) entering, using, or occupying 
any part of the System, unless specific exemptions apply. 53 
B. Judicial Construction 
The power of the Secretary to freely exchange land from within 
the System has withstood one court challenge. In Sierra Club v. 
Hickel,54 (hereinafter cited as Sierra Club), the plaintiffs challenged 
an exchange of land which had been made by the United States 
Government, through the Secretary of the Interior, and a utility 
company, pursuant to Section 4b of the 1966 Act. The United States 
gave up a marshland which was part of the System in exchange for 
marshland privately owned by the utility. In addition, the utility 
agreed to lease back to the government, rent-free, for a period of 50 
years, 455 acres of the exchanged land. Certain other adjacent land 
was also leased to the government for 25 years, subject to some 
reserved rights, to be used as a wildlife refuge. The utility also 
agreed to make certain improvements on the land, including the 
construction of dikes. The net result of the exchange was that the 
United States received a wildlife refuge twice as large as it had 
originally owned, plus various improvements, and the utility re-
ceived lands needed for the construction of a nuclear power plant. 
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, contending that the 
transfer of the land was an arbitrary and capricious act and an 
abuse of discretion by the Secretary of the Interior. The Sierra Club 
also sought an order directing re-vestiture of title to the land in the 
United States. The court rejected the request, observing that invali-
dation of the exchange would necessarily require the return of all 
lands to their original owners. In effect, such a result would be a 
court-ordered disposition of government property, barred by the 
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sovereign immunity doctrine. The court held that the Administra-
tive Procedure Act55 did not waive sovereign immunity in an action 
involving the Secretary of the Interior. 
The Secretary was recognized to have broad discretion, under the 
statute, to determine whether to enter into an agreement for the 
exchange of land. Since the Act vested broad discretion in the Secre-
tary in reaching a decision involving land acquisition, without any 
requirement that he consider the particular environmental factors 
involved, the court held the Secretary's action to be non-reviewable. 
Moreover, the· court held that resort to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act was unwarranted because the Secretary's action was one 
of the type "com~itted to agency discretion by law."58 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Feikens argued that this interpre-
tation of the Administrative Procedure Act was too narrow; an 
agency may not exercise uncontrolled discretion, and actions taken 
under however broad a grant of authority are still subject to review 
for abuse of discretion. 57 
The court was concerned with practical, as well as legal, consider-
ations, as indicated by its fear that" ... [i]f a third person is 
allowed to litigate the validity of an exchange of land made by the 
Secretary of Interior, whenever he believes that the Secretary acted 
improperly, there will be no more exchanges and the action of Con-
gress providing for them will be frustrated."s8 The court concluded 
unequivocally that "[T]here is no question but that the Secretary 
of Interior was empowered by [16 U.S.C.] §668dd(b)(3) to make 
the exchange. "59 
The dissent rejected defendant's contention that Section 668dd 
gives the Secretary total discretion to dispose of any land, regardless 
of the harmful effect which such transfer might have on the system 
being administered. The intent of Congress, expressed in 16 U.S.C. 
668aa, was seen by the dissent as requiring the Secretary to protect 
endangered species and to consider the effect that an exchange of 
land would have on such species. 
The dissent also rejected the contention that the purposes clause 
of the Act imposes no legal duty upon the Secretary, since, if it did 
not, the Act would be infirm as an unconstitutional delegation of 
authority. If there are no standards by which it is possible to deter-
mine". . . whether the will of the Congress has been obliged," the 
delegation is too vague.80 The power of an agency, in the view of the 
dissent, is circumscribed by the authority granted in the empower-
ing act. The dissent noted that since the administrative regulations 
do not detail the purposes for which the exchange may be made, the 
court must turn to the only guidelines available, which are the 
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general purposes for which the various environmental statutes were 
enacted. With regard to the 1966 Act, the dissent concluded that the 
language of the statute ". . . imposes a duty on the Secretary to 
consider environmental effects and the effect on the wildlife system 
as a whole before he transfers land out of the system. If he has not 
done so, his action is ultra vires. "81 
The effect of the Sierra Club decision was to drastically reduce 
the importance of the sections of the 1966 Act dealing with the 
System. Since the majority decided that land exchanges could be 
made without any consideration of the environmental factors ad-
dressed by the legislation, the court in effect read the statute as 
providing no guarantees of protection for endangered species at all. 
Arguably, the dissent more closely aligns itself with the intention 
of Congress, which was to require federal agencies to take measures 
to protect endangered fish and wildlife. 
The 1966 Act was inadequate both as an act compelling positive 
actions and as a prohibitive measure. The Act confined its prohibi-
tions to actions within the System, allowing hunting, capture, and 
exploitation of endangered species to continue unhindered outside 
of the System, absent applicable local laws. In addition to confining 
its attention to the destruction of habitat, the 1966 Act also limited 
itself to the protection of native wildlife, ignoring the international 
aspects of the endangered species problem. 
III. THE 1969 ACT 
To assist in the international effort to preserve endangered spec-
ies, as well as to attack the problem of over-commercialization of 
endangered species, Congress passed the 1969 Act, which, while 
amending the 1966 Act in part, added several significant provisions. 
During discussion of the Act, over-commercialization was recog-
nized as a major cause of extinction,82 although attempts to de-
emphasize the importance of this factor were made.83 
A. Provisions of the Act 
The major addition under the 1969 Act was a provision which 
required the Secretary of the Interior to develop a list of endangered 
species and sub-species.84 The importation of such animals or their 
by-products was forbidden without a permit.85 A permit could be 
granted if the importation was for zoological, educational, scientific, 
or propagational purposes.88 This exemption was granted because of 
the valuable role that zoological, educational, and other institutions 
had played in the preservation of endangered species.87 Although 
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zoos had taken the initiative in the past to protect endangered spec-
ies,88 some government control was desired because of the fear that 
the appetite of zoos and circuses for rare animals would cause the 
disappearance of certain species from their native habitat. 89 
Regulations were promulgated to implement the permit system.70 
These regulations focused primarily on the effect on the wild popu-
lation which would occur if the permit were granted, the desirability 
of the project involved, the availability of the animals from non-wild 
sources, the adequacy of the shipping arrangements, and the quality 
of the personnel and facilities at the destination. Under this permit 
system, approximately one-half of all applications were denied,71 
indicating that what was considered proper for importation by zool-
ogical and educational institutions did not always correspond with 
what the Department of the Interior considered necessary or appro-
priate. 
In addition to zoological and educational permits, importation 
was also allowed to avoid "undue economic hardship."72 Under this 
exemption, an executory contract entered into for the importation 
of an animal prior to the listing of its species as endangered could 
be completed, under special permit from the Secretary of the Inte-
rior.73 The "hardship" exemption was not motivated by concerns 
that such activities may be beneficial to the continued survival of 
the species, as the zoological exemption was, but only to avoid in-
flicting undue economic hardship upon the particular parties in-
volved. A test balancing the effects of such importation on the wild 
population against the severity of the economic hardship was re-
quired to be met before a "hardship" exemption would be granted.74 
The purpose behind the prohibitions of the 1969 Act was to reduce 
the market both for the endangered species themselves and for the 
goods which are manufactured from such animals, thereby reducing 
the incentive to slaughter them, and thus, decreasing the strain on 
the wild population.75 
In addition to import controls, the 1969 Act addressed the inter-
national aspects of the extinction problem in another way. The 
Secretary of the Interior was directed to seek the convening of an 
international ministerial meeting on fish and wildlife, to aid the 
worldwide conservation of endangered species as well as to prevent 
competitive harm to United States industry which was affected by 
the 1969 Act.78 
Such a meeting was held in February, 1973, attended by eighty 
nations.77 A wildlife treaty was adopted which banned trade in the 
animals and their by-products, absent compliance with strict per-
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mit requirements. The agreement, known as the Convention on In-
ternational Trade in Endangered Wild Fauna and Flora,78 (herein-
after cited as the Convention), was signed in Washington on March 
2, 1973.79 The Convention establishes a cooperative effort, within the 
United Nations framework, to save endangered species by control-
ling their transportation between nations. It classifies animals into 
three categories, and provides separate schemes of regulation for 
each. Appendix I of the Convention lists all species threatened with 
extinction which are or may be affected by trade.80 In order to ship 
an animal listed in this appendix from one country to another, both 
an import permit and an export permit must be obtained.81 An 
export permit will only be granted if such export will not be detri-
mental to the survival of the species, the specimen was not obtained 
in violation of law, preparation and shipment are done so as to 
minimize the risk of injury or cruel treatment, and proof has been 
given that an import permit has been granted.82 An import permit 
will only be granted if such import will not be detrimental to the 
survival of the species, the importer is suitably equipped to house 
and care for the animal, and the specimen is not to be used primar-
ily for commercial purposes.83 To introduce a sea animal on the list 
into the country, the same criteria must be met which are required 
for receiving an import permit.84 . 
Although this set of regulations seems to provide thorough protec-
tion for endangered species, one major weakness exists. No defini-
tion is given for the phrase "commercial purposes", and without 
such a definition, the true impact of these requirements cannot be 
known. If "commercial" means purely for display, exhibition, or 
entertainment for profit, with no consideration of scientific or edu-
cational factors contributing to continued survival, then the restric-
tion on importation is appropriate. However, if the phrase simply 
means that money is involved in the transaction, or that admission 
is charged when the animal is put on display, then the restriction 
is too broad and might actually work to the detriment of an endan-
gered species. A scientific institution might perform valuable re-
search aimed at protecting endangered species, but might also pur-
chase its specimens for money, or put them on display part-time to 
raise money to continue their research. In such a situation, classify-
ing such activities as "commercial", thus denying such institutions 
specimens with which to work, would be unfortunate. The narrower 
definition, besides being the more desirable, is also the one which 
is the most logical in the present context, since the Convention 
speaks of specimens which are used "primarily for commercial 
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purposes."85 The word "primarily" should not be defined quantita-
tively, such as by deciding that a specimen cannot be used for 
commercial purposes more than 50% of the time, but instead should 
be defined qualitatively by balancing the benefits that are derived 
during the non-commercial use of the specimen against the detri-
ment to the animal or its species which may occur during the com-
mercial use of that specimen. 
A second Appendix lists animals which, although not now neces-
sarily threatened with extinction, may become so unless trade is 
subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible 
with their survival. Other species which must be regulated in order 
that threatened species may be brought under effective control are 
also included in Appendix II.86 In order to trade in animals listed in 
this appendix, an export permit must be received. In order to obtain 
such a permit, the exporter must meet the same criteria which exist 
for receipt of a permit pertaining to an animal in Appendix 1.87 
A third Appendix lists animals which are subject to regulation 
within a country to prevent or restrict exploitation, and which can 
only be effectively controlled with the cooperation of other coun-
tries.88 Animals listed in this appendix are also subject to export 
controls, although the restrictions are somewhat less stringent than 
for Appendix II animals.89 
The response of the United States to the adoption of the Conven-
tion was passage of the 1973 Act, which was patterned after the 
Convention and implemented many of its provisions. The 1973 Act 
will be discussed in depth following a review of other aspects of the 
1969 Act. 
In addition to addressing international issues, the 1969 Act also 
strengthened laws for the protection of native wildlife. The Lacey 
Act was expanded to prohibit the sale or purchase of reptiles, am-
phibians, mollusks, and crustaceans taken in violation of foreign or 
state laws, adding to the previously existing prohibitions concerning 
fish, mammals, and birds,uo This expansion is important because it 
recognizes that the extinction of an animal in one of the newly 
added groups can affect the balance of nature just as much as the 
extinction of a fish, mammal, or bird. 
The 1969 Act also provided added protection for domestic species, 
expanding the habitat protection authority beyond that of the 1966 
Act by authorizing the acquisition of privately owned lands within 
any area administered by the Secretary of the Interior". . . for the 
purpose of conserving, protecting, restoring, or propagating native 
species."91 This provision is particularly vital for the protection of 
domestic endangered species with little commercial importance, 
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since the other provisions of the 1969 Act have their greatest impact 
in protecting species which are threatened because of their economic 
value. 92 
B. Judicial Construction 
An important legal issue raised by the 1969 Act was the extent to 
which the federal legislation preempted state laws. The fundamen-
tal doctrine of preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution, and holds that a state measure which con-
flicts with a federal requirement must be invalidated.93 
In the case of A.E. Nettleton v. Diamond,94 (hereinafter cited as 
Nettleton), a New York manufacturer of alligator shoes sought a 
declaratory judgment that New York's Mason Act95 and Harris 
Act,98 which prohibited the sale within the state of animals of cer-
tain species, as well as products made from their skins or bodies, 
were unconstitutional. Plaintiff's contention that the 1969 Act was 
an elaborate, comprehensive and pervasive scheme of federal regu-
lation that curtailed state power in the field of wildlife protection 
was rejected by the New York Court of Appeals in light of Florida 
Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul. 97 In that case the Supreme 
Court sustained the constitutionality of a California statute which 
prohibited the marketing in the state of avoca does which were mar-
ketable under federal standards. Preemption did not occur because 
neither of two criteria was met: there was not ". . . such actual 
conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot 
stand in the same area, "98 and there was no evidence of ". . . a 
congressional design to preempt the field."99 
In Nettleton, the court found that the laws involved were not in 
conflict, even though the Mason Act listed certain species as endan-
gered which were not included on the federal list. Because the state 
list contained a larger number of endangered species than the fed-
eral list, compliance with the state law would necessarily entail 
compliance with the federal law. The plaintiff was unable to show 
that the enforcement of the state act would in any way impair the 
effectiveness of the federal law. 
The court also recognized that the 1969 Act sanctioned the contin-
ued validity of state laws by specifically providing federal enforce-
ment for the sale or transportation of wildlife taken in violation of 
such state laws. too Regulations promulgated pursuant to the 1969 
Act also recognized that preemption did not occur by stating that 
nothing in the regulations should relieve any person from any provi-
sion of any other law of a state or the United States. tOt 
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A state's police power, recognized as the least limited of all gov-
ernmental powers,102 has been construed to include the conservation 
of fish and wildlife. lo3The displacement of this historic police power 
is not to be presumed unless ". . . that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress."104 The exercise of a state's police power is 
reasonable and valid if there is a " ... fair, just, and reasonable 
connection between [the exercise of the police power] and the pro-
motion of the health, comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 105 The 
court recognized the benefit to the welfare of society played by the 
protection of endangered species, because of their key role in the 
maintenance of the life cycle. Therefore, the court held that the 
Mason and Harris Acts were valid exercises of New York's police 
power, and were not preempted by the passage of the 1969 Act. 
The court did, however, modify the application of the Mason Act 
by exempting the sale of skins taken prior to the passage of that Act, 
if the seller could satisfactorily document the time of taking. 108 The 
court's rationale for this interpretation was that the sale of such 
skins could in no way work contrary to the purposes of the Mason 
Act, since such a ban could not protect animals already destroyed. 
The court rejected contentions by the plaintiff that the New York 
laws violated the Commerce Clause. The decision of the same court 
in Bootman,107 interpreting the Lacey Act, provided a precedent for 
rejecting such a contention. Additionally, the Mason and Harris 
Acts merely prohibited the sale or offer for sale of animal products 
within the state, thus rendering the Commerce Clause arguments 
meritless. 
The conclusion of the Nettleton court, that the Mason and Harris 
Acts were valid exercises of the state's police powers and not 
preempted by the federal legislation, was supported in a Federal 
decision rendered by the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York. In Palladio u. Diamond,108 (hereinafter 
cited as Palladio), the district court accepted the Nettleton argu-
ments on preemption, finding no inconsistency or conflict between 
the state and federal legislation, and noting that the federallegisla-
tion invited state action. IOU 
The plaintiff in Palladio was a Massachusetts corporation which 
sold shoes within New York state which were made of alligator, 
caiman, and crocodile skin. As in the Nettleton case, plaintiff 
sought a declaration that the Mason and Harris Acts were unconsti-
tutional. The court rejected arguments that the state legislation was 
objectionable because it interfered with interstate commerce for 
solely esthetic purposes. The court noted that the Acts were sup-
ported by non-esthetic interests, thereby justifying the exercise of 
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broad police powers. IIO Additionally, the court recognized that a 
state may minimally affect interstate commerce even when the pur-
poses involved are of an esthetic nature. III The court found no inter-
ference with congressional power to regulate commerce, make treat-
ies, or control foreign affairs. Nor was the Supremacy Clause vio-
lated by the New York legislation. 
The court accepted the state's right to promulgate a list of endan-
gered species which differed from the federal list because the list 
promulgated by the Secretary was nowhere indicated to be defini-
tive. The court recognized that "[t]he state's list may be broader 
than the federal list simply because the State Legislature did not 
see fit to wait until only a handful of species remained before it 
passed a law affording protection."112 The court similarly rejected 
contentions that the dealer involved was deprived of property with-
out due process of law by the New York legislation, merely because 
he would lose money as a result of its enactment. The court observed 
that the plaintiff had no property rights in wildlife of a foreign 
country. 
Two major deficiencies of the 1969 Act were the lack of control 
over activities occurring within the United States for the protection 
of endangered speciesll3 and the inability of the Secretary of the 
Interior to become involved in the problem until a species had be-
come so endangered that the chances of assisting in its continued 
survival were severely limited. 1I4 Limiting the Secretary's jurisdic-
tion to activities involving animals which were already endangered 
prevented him from taking steps to assure that an animal which was 
on the verge of becoming endangered would be protected and 
thereby saved from joining the ranks of the "endangered." In order 
to address these and other criticisms of the 1969 Act, the 1973 Act 
was passed. 
IV. THE 1973 ACT 
Finding that "the inadequacy of existing regulatory measures" 
was one of several factors contributing to the continuing problem of 
animal extinction,1I5 Congress passed the 1973 Act, totally replacing 
the 1969 Act, and superseding all of the 1966 Act except for the 
provisions relating to the National Wildlife Refuge System. 
A. Provisions of the Act 
Section 4 of the 1973 Act directs the Secretary of the Interior to 
compile a list of "threatened species", to supplement the list of 
"endangered species" required by the 1969 Act.1I8 An "endangered 
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species" is defined as ". . . any species which is in danger of extinc-
tion throughout all or a significant portion of its range ... "118.1 
Alth~ugh this definition is particularized by the requirement that 
animals be listed as endangered". . . on the basis of the best scien-
tific i.and commercial data available,"118.2 the term still lacks specif-
icity~ An alternative definition would be a quantitative one which 
estafulished a threshold level for each species. When the number of 
animals within a species dropped below that threshold level, the 
speciies would automatically be listed as endangered. Such a system 
is irPpractical because the determination of a different threshold 
leve} for each species or group of species would be unduly burden-
som~, and the use of a single rigid level for all species is inadvisable 
due "to the diverse characteristics of various species. The term 
"threatened species" is defined to include ". . . any species which 
is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable 
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range."117 The 
Secretary is empowered to issue". . . such regulations as he deems 
necessary and advisable for the conservation of such species."lIs 
These regulations may prohibit any activity which is forbidden with 
respect to endangered species in other sections of the Act, although 
the regulations also may be more lenient. lID No regulations have yet 
been promulgated under this section, and no animals are presently 
listed as "threatened", although such regulations are expected in 
1975.120 The new classification ("threatened") was established 
because one of the reasons cited for the continuing extinction prob-
lem, notwithstanding the passage of the 1966 and 1969 Acts, was 
that the previous legislation did not provide" ... the kind of man-
agement tools needed to act early enough to save a vanishing spec-
ies."121 Now the Department of the Interior has the power to act to 
protect animals before they actually become endangered. 
Section 6 of the Act directs the Secretary to cooperate economi-
cally, administratively, and managerially with states that establish 
conservation programs which are determined to be in accordance 
with the Act. 122 Furthermore, Section 6 specifically states the rela-
tionship of the 1973 Act to similar state legislation, therebyobviat-
ing the preemption problems which were arguably present under the 
1969 Act. l23 Under the 1973 Act, state laws and regulations dealing 
with importation, exportation, and interstate or foreign commerce 
in endangered or threatened species are declared void if they permit 
what is prohibited by the Act or if they prohibit what is authorized 
under an exemption or permit in the Act. l24 However, the 1973 Act 
specifically provides that no other state law or regulation intended 
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as a conservation measure should be construed as void, because of 
the 1973 Act. 125 State laws relating to the taking of endangered or 
threatened species may be more restrictive than the permits or ex-
emptions included in the Act, but not less restrictive. 128 
Section 8 extends the aid program of Section 6 to foreign countries 
and urges international cooperation in establishing programs to :pro-
tect endangered species. 127 This provision is especially vital for. un-
derdeveloped countries which lack the financial capability or tech-
nical expertise needed to manage an effective wildlife conservation 
program. Financial assistance (including the acquisition of la~ds, 
waters, or interests therein) and technical assistance (including C(on-
sultation with government agencies knowledgeable in the field)i are 
authorized by the Act. 128 
In Section 9a, the 1973 Act expands the list of prohibited activi.· 
ties far beyond any of the previous acts. 129 In addition to prohibitions 
against importation (included in the 1969 Act) and prohibitions 
against the movement in interstate commerce of animals taken in 
violation of local laws (included in the Lacey Act), this section bans 
exporting, taking within the United States or on the high seas, 
possessing or transporting any endangered species illegally taken, 
transporting any endangered species in interstate or foreign 
commerce for commercial purposes, or offering to sell or selling such 
animals in interstate or foreign commerce.130 Finally, protection was 
afforded for the first time to endangered species of plants. 131 
Although Congress recognized that hunting and destruction of 
natural habitat are the major causes of extinction,132 most of the 
prohibitions of the 1973 Act address another cause of extinction: 
over-commercialization. Even the prohibition against "taking" 
(which is arguably the only prohibition in the Act directly dealing 
with the problem of hunting) also addresses the over-
commercialization issue, since "taking" is defined to include cap-
ture or collection. l33 
The prohibitions contained in the 1973 Act go beyond the scope 
of federal power encompassed in the Commerce Clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution, even though the definition of "interstate com-
merce" has been expanded to include activity which is only mini-
mally related to such commerce. 1M The taking of an animal within 
a state for purely private use within that state, and the capture and 
possession within a state of an endangered animal (with no inten-
tion of leaving the state), are two examples of activities which are 
prohibited by the 1973 Act, but which are arguably beyond the 
power of Congress to regulate by reliance on the Commerce Clause. 
Instead of relying on the Commerce Clause, the Congress based its 
\ 
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autho~ty to establish such prohibitions on its treaty-making pow-
ers. I35 ,Reliance on this authority is shown by the assertion that one 
of thEf purposes of the Act is to ". . . take all appropriate steps to 
implqment the Nation's international commitments."138 Several of 
the i1\tternational commitments are listed in Section 2 of the Act, 
inclukiing the Convention. 137 
Tile extent to which congressional power can be expanded by a 
treatl.1 was addressed by the Supreme Court in Missouri v. 
Holl¢ndl38 (hereinafter cited as Holland). The United States and 
Grelit Britain had concluded a treaty in 1916 protecting migratory 
bird~ traveling between Canada and the United States. In 1918, 
Congress passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, forbidding the sale 
of ~~ratory birds and authorizing the establishment of regulations 
by -the Department of Agriculture to implement the Act. The State 
/of Missouri brought a bill in equity to stop enforcement of the Act, 
~ asserting a violation of the Tenth Amendment regarding the rights 
/ reserved to the states, and also claiming an infringement of its prop-
erty rights, as owner of the wild birds within its borders. The district 
court held the statute unconstitutional on the theory that the fed-
eral government could not legislate in the area since the birds be-
longed to the state for the benefit of its citizens. In so ruling, the 
lower court followed the reasoning set out in State v. McCullagh,139 
(hereinafter cited as McCullagh), which invalidated a 1913 enact-
ment of Congress that attempted to protect all migratory birds and 
provide federal penalties for killing them. Overruling the lower court 
in Holland, the Supreme Court noted a significant distinction from 
the earlier McCullagh case. Without overruling the McCullagh deci-
sion, the Court distinguished this case because the 1918 legislation 
was not merely the enactment of a federal statute, as the 1913 Act 
had been, but dealt instead with a statute implementing a treaty. 
Article Four, Section Two of the Constitution expressly delegates 
the treaty-making power to the Congress, and Article Six indicates 
that such treaties, along with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, are the supreme law of the land. The Court pro-
ceeded from the assumption that if the treaty was valid, then the 
statute would necessarily be valid under Article One, Section Eight 
as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the gov-
ernment. The Court then concluded that the treaty was valid. Ex-
amining the extent of the government's treaty-making power, the 
Court concluded that what Congress could not accomplish on its 
own, it might be able to do when acting pursuant to a legally con-
cluded treaty. The Court emphasized the differences between treaty 
{ 
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power and statute-making power by noting that ". . . [a] ts of 
Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in p rsu-
ance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so .,hen 
made under the authority of the United States."l4o Limitatiorts on 
the treaty-making power, therefore, must be ascertained in a d~ffer­
ent way than for the statute-making pow.er, recognizing the possibil-
ity that there may exist". . . matters of the sharpest exigenc~ for 
the national well-being that an Act of Congress could not deal ~ith, 
but that a treaty followed by such an act could."141 The limita~ion 
placed on the treaty-making power by the Court forbids the imple~ 
mentation of a treaty which contravenes specific prohibitive w~rds 
in the Constitution, but not a treaty which infringes only on ge1-eral 
clauses, such as the general grant of powers to the states under- t,he 
Tenth Amendment. \ 
The Court's reasoning in Holland relates more to practical consid-", 
erations than to legal ones. The Court recognized. the existence of a 
national interest (the protection of migratory birds) which could be 
protected effectively only by action taken at a national level, in 
concert with another national power. Since state control (or the lack 
of control) would not adequately protect the national interest, the 
federal government had to have authority to become involved and 
protect its interests through its treaty-making power. Holland 
clearly establishes a precedent for sustaining the validity of the 1973 
Act under the treaty-making powers. A problem of national interest 
is involved, recognized as such both in earlier congressional actions 
and in international agreements, and one which arguably cannot be 
adequately protected by the states, since an t;!ndangered species 
which is located in only one state may be destroyed by state inac-
tion. Since the United States has concluded treaties addressing the 
extinction problem, the enactment of the 1973 Act to carry out the 
purposes of such treaties is analogous to the congressional enact-
ment of 1918 which was sustained by the Court in Holland. 
B. Exempted Activities 
Section 9b of the 1973 Act provides exemptions for persons en-
gaged in otherwise prohibited activities, if the fish or wildlife in-
volved in that activity were held in captivity or in a controlled 
environment on the effective date of the statute (December 28, 
1973).142 The exemption does not apply if the holding occurred as 
part of a commercial activity or if the holding is contrary to the 
general purposes of the Act (reducing animal extinction).I43 Com-
mercial activities have been defined to include direct sales, trades, 
-', 
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and barters, but not gifts, even if a similar gift is later sent by the 
donee to the donor .144 An exchange of gifts is permitted if two 
separate transactions are involved, and each gift is made without 
assurance of any gain or profit by barter, credit, or any other form 
of compensation. This exemption arguably opens a loophole which 
allows institutions to barter without losing their exemption. A trans-
action which is really a barter can be disguised as a series of separate 
gifts by not revealing that obligations are incurred by each party. 
This loophole, however, is acceptable since gifts between institu-
tions should be encouraged. The benefits derived from free exchange 
of gifts for non-commercial purposes outweigh whatever detriment 
may result from allowing a few institutions to conduct barters under 
the guise of gifts. Endangered species held by commercial zoos (as 
distinguished from non-profit institutions) are ineligible for this 
. exemption, as are all progeny of animals held in captivity, if born 
after the effective date of the legislation, regardless of whether the 
, holder is a commercial or non-profit entity.145 
Arguments can be advanced that the exemption is drawn both too 
narrowly and too broadly. Proponents of a wider exemption can 
claim that no animal in captivity need be subject to interstate regu-
lation because other controls, already available, sufficiently handle 
the situation. Foreign endangered species are regulated upon entry 
into the country,148 and importation permits would not have been 
granted if such importation would endanger the chances of survival 
for the species. Once the animal is in captivity, so the argument 
goes, its subsequent movement in commerce can have no effect on 
the wild population. Therefore, no animal in captivity would need 
to be regulated. This reasoning would eliminate the distinction be-
tween commercial and non-commercial activities, since the nature 
of the transaction would not affect the wild population, thus making 
a distinction based on economic considerations illogical. Similarly, 
offspring born in captivity would remain unregulated, since, once 
again, there would be no effect on the wild population. 
With respect to domestic endangered species, proponents of the 
wider exemption can argue that the only way such an animal can 
be brought into captivity from the wild is through an exemption 
from the "taking" ban included in the Act. 147 The permit process for 
receiving such an exemption will presumably assure that the animal 
will not be removed from the wild if such an action will be detrimen-
tal to the continued survival of the species. 148 As above, the conclu-
sion to this argument is that once an animal is in captivity, any 
subsequent transaction involving that captive animal cannot possi-
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bly affect the wild population. The major fallacy in this line of 
argument is the implicit assumption that all animals in captivity 
were obtained through legal importation or taking. Such an assump-
tion fails to recognize the widespread existence of smuggling in the 
endangered species industryYu The possession by the Department 
of Interior of two million dollars worth of smuggled wildlife products 
is indicative of the widespread existence of such smuggling. 150 The 
judiciary has also failed to appreciate the widespread existence of 
the smuggling industry. In Fur Information and Fashion Counsel, 
Inc. v. E.F. Timme and Son, Inc., 151 furriers challenged the validity 
of an advertisement which claimed that the purchase of fake furs 
would help to save endangered animals. The court concluded: 
The net effect of the statutes [the 1969 Act and the Lacey Act] and 
regulations promulgated thereunder by the Secretary of the Interior is . 
that no plaintiff, and no member of the purported class, may cut, manu-
facture, or sell furs of such endangered species, nor may any apparel be 
made or sold therefrom in the United States. The Government, by dili-
gent enforcement, has obtained full compliance. It would be impossible 
as a practical matter for such high fashion apparel. . . to be cut, manu-
factured, or sold in the United States, even clandestinely. To do so 
would require the joint conspiratorial activities of too many persons ... 
and the risks are simply too great. . . . Defendant suggests that it is 
possible in some of the backward areas of the world to purchase such a 
coat and for the customer to wear or carry it into the United States as 
personal clothing. No evidence was received in support of this unlikely 
suggestion, and the hypothesis is so far fetched that it may be disre-
garded. u2 
If importation controls were perfect, perhaps no internal controls 
over foreign endangered species would be necessary, 'but the system 
is presently not at that stage. Animals are brought into the country 
on forged documents,153 hidden in false-bottomed crates,'54 listed 
under fictitious names,155 and mixed in with non-endangered species 
to avoid detection.158 If no internal controls existed, a smuggler 
would have an unregulated market to trade in as soon as he was able 
to bypass the importation screen. An unscrupulous animal dealer or 
institution could obtain illegally imported animals and dispose of 
them with other such animals legally obtained, with virtually no 
scrutiny of its actions. The 1973 Act was designed to regulate traffic 
in endangered species at every step in the distribution chain,157 thus 
providing additional opportunities to detect illegally imported ani-
mals, even after the initial regulatory control of customs inspection 
has been evaded. 
Those who favor narrowing or even eliminating the exemption 
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altogether may argue that the exemption creates a loophole which 
allows the movement of animals without a permit, by falsely claim-
ing that the animal was held in captivity on the effective date. 
However, the effect of this argument is greatly lessened because the 
1973 Act provides that anyone attempting to transact business in 
endangered species more than 180 days after the effective date of 
the legislation must overcome a rebuttable presumption that the 
animal involved was not held in captivity on the required date. ISS 
Such a burden on the actor subjects the transaction to some govern-
mental scrutiny, even though a permit is not required. This alloca-
tion of the burden of proof also places the responsibility upon the 
person who is closer to the situation, has better access to relevant 
records, and generally is in a better position to provide any relevant 
information on the situation. The importance of the national inter-
est involved (protection of wildlife for the public welfare) supports 
the principle that the private party attempting to avoid the regula-
tory scheme should accept a greater burden than the government. 
Proponents of a narrower exemption could find the distinction 
drawn between exempt animals (those held in captivity prior to 
December 28, 1973) and their non-exempt progeny (those born after 
the enactment date) to be illogical and unacceptable. The basic 
premise behind the argument for narrower exemptions is that in-
creased transactions lead to increased demand, thereby causing a 
larger drain on the wild population, assuming that many of the 
newly captured animals can be smuggled into the country. If such 
reasoning is accepted, the conclusion must be reached that transac~ 
tions in exempted animals will increase demand as much as trans-
actions in their non-exempt offspring will. Thus the conclusion that 
both groups should be covered by the same set of regulations. 
Whether one argues in favor of broadening the current exemp-
tions, or narrowing them, one conclusion is the same: the distinction 
made by the legislation between animals in captivity and their pro-
geny is inconsistent. Either both groups should be covered by the 
same exemption or neither of them should. The reason for the dis-
tinction is not based on science or logic. Rather, it is political in 
origin. The distinction was a compromise aimed at assuring passage 
of the Act. IS• The reasoning behind the exemption was that the 
number of animals involved was small, and would eventually de-
crease to zero, at which time all captive animals of endangered 
species would be regulated. 180 Looking at the 1973 Act logically, 
rather than politically, the distinction between captive animals and 
their progeny should be eliminated. Recognizing the possibility of 
smuggling as a reality, the better alternative is to do away with the 
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exemption, requiring all captive endangered animals to be subject 
to permit procedures. 
Another questionable distinction the exemption draws is that be-
tween commercial and non-commercial activities. No commercial 
activities are exempt from the permit requirements, while non-
commercial activities are exempt, if the animals involved in the 
transaction were being held on the effective date of the Act. l81 The 
flaw in such a distinction results from the definition of "commercial 
activity" in the statute as ". . . all activities of industry and trade, 
including, but not limited to, the buying or selling of commodities 
and activities conducted for the purpose of facilitating such buying 
and selling."112 Under administrative construction, this phrase has 
been more explicitly defined to include any dealings involving 
money or other things of value, even if done by non-profit institu-
tions. 113 The basis for the distinction is unsound. The important 
factor to be considered when distinguishing between different activ-
ities which involve endangered species is not whether money is in-
volved in the transaction, but rather what effect the transaction will 
have on the species' chance for survival. Some of the best breeding 
programs in the country are conducted by commercial, profit-
making organizations. II. The "commercial" nature of such activities 
does not detract from their beneficial results. Therefore, they should 
not be subject to stricter regulations simply because money is in-
volved in the transaction. A zoological institution, known for its 
contributions to research for endangered species, is no less effective 
as a researcher if it obtains its specimens through commercial deal-
ings, rather than by donation. Arguably, its effectiveness as a: re-
search institution is increased if it can plan for the future systemati-
cally, based on its ability to buy specimens as needed, rather than 
having to rely on the unpredictability of possible donations. It has 
been argued that a commercial organization actually has a greater 
interest in the continuation of a species than a non-commercial 
organization does, since the loss of a species results in an economic 
loss to the commercial organization which would not be incurred by 
a non-commercial entity involved in the same research programs.115 
It is submitted that the distinction the statute seeks to make can 
be more rationally approached. Some distinction should be made 
between a commercial organization with a history of concern and 
scientific expertise relating to endangered species and a small trav-
eling circus or show, whose only concern is profit, and which has 
never contributed anything to the continued survival of any species 
except its owners. Under the present regulations, no distinction is 
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made between these two organizations when considering exemp-
tions. Both are considered "commercial" and therefore ineligible for 
exemption. A better system would be to assign a "commerciali-
zation factor" to each institution which applies for an exemption. 
This factor would balance an institution's contribution to the plight 
of endangered species against the damage which might result to the 
species because ofthat institution's dealings in that species. Consid-
eration might be given to the extent to which the display of an 
animal detracts from its ability to breed, the expertise of the person-
nel handling the animals, and the contributions which the institu-
tion has made toward educating people concerning the plight of 
endangered species. The use of such a factor would be more rational 
than the straight money-related test which is now employed, and 
would give cognizance to contributions directed toward the allevia-
tion of the plight of endangered species which have been made by 
many commercial organizations. 188 
C. Permits 
In addition to the exemptions provided for captive animals, other 
exemptions are also available under the 1973 Act. Section 10 of the 
Act establishes guidelines for the granting of permits to engage in 
activities normally prohibited by the Act. 187 Permits may be granted 
for "scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of 
the affected species."188 This exemption is narrower than a similar 
one provided in the 1969 Act, which included zoological, educa-
tional, scientific, and propagational purposes.18U 
A second basis for receiving a permit is based on undue economic 
hardship.I7O This exemption is also narrower than a similar exemp-
tion in the 1969 Act, since the legislation now provides that no 
permit may be issued which will operate to the disadvantage of the 
endangered species involved,171 while the 1969 Act merely required 
that a balancing test be made between the economic hardship in-
volved and the amount of detriment to the species which would 
occury2 The requirement under the 1973 Act (that no detriment to 
the species be allowed) is superior to the balancing test required 
under the 1969 Act, since the survival ofthe species should outweigh 
even severe economic hardship. The test set up under the 1973 Act 
is difficult, but not impossible, to meet. If an importer can show 
that no animal will be removed from the wild to replace the one 
being imported, then the test is probably satisfied. If the exporting 
country has effectively enforced laws prohibiting the taking of en-
dangered animals, the importer has a stronger argument that no 
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animal will be removed from the wild to replace the one being im-
ported. The importer may also show that the animal he is importing 
was not removed from the wild for the purpose of importation, but 
was in captivity for a different reason. Acceptable reasons might be 
that the animal was born in captivity in the foreign country, that it 
has been in a zoo or similar institution in a foreign country prior to 
the enactment of importation controls, or that it was removed from 
the wild because it was in danger of being destroyed if it was left 
there. One additional factor which the importer might be asked to 
prove is that the animal is not scheduled for re-introduction into the 
wild if not imported. 
In deciding whether an "economic hardship" permit should be 
granted for the importation of a by-product of an endangered spec-
ies, the administrator should consider the same criteria which are 
applicable to the exemption for the importation of live animals. 
Namely, what effect will the importation have on the species' con-
tinued survival? An importer may be able to justify a proposed 
transaction by showing that the product involved is unique, perhaps 
because of its historic or artistic quality, and therefore could not be 
replaced by the taking of a similar animal from the wild. For exam-
ple, if an importer wanted to import a scrimshaw masterpiece done 
by a famous artist of the past, or if he wanted to import a leopard 
skin robe worn by an African chief one hundred years ago, there is 
little danger that the article to be imported will be replaced by the 
taking of another endangered animal from the wild concurrent with 
the importation of the article. The uniqueness of the article im-
ported assures that its replacement will not be achieved by the 
slaughter of more animals. The burden placed on the importer to 
obtain an economic hardship exemption is a hard one to meet, but 
justifiably so, considering the irreversibility of the extinction pro-
cess. 
One additional exemption is provided in the 1973 Act to 
permanent residents of native Alaskan villages, when their taking 
of an endangered species is primarily for subsistance purposes.173 
The number of persons involved in this exemption and the potential 
detrimental effect on endangered species are both minimal,174 but 
added safeguards are available since the Secretary may regulate 
such taking if it materially and negatively affects the species in-
volved.175 
The administration of the permit system under Section 10 has 
been severely criticized. The major criticism leveled at the adminis-
trator is that long delays occur between application for a permit and 
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its approval or rejectionY6 All permit requests are subject to a mini-
mum amount of delay due to the notice requirements contained in 
the Act. Notice of all permit applications must be published in the 
Federal Register, inviting comments to be submitted within thirty 
days.177 Since it takes at least six days to get a notice published in 
the Federal Register, and another six days are allowed at the end of 
the period to consider late comments, a minimum of 42 days are 
necessary for consideration of any permit application. 178 The delay 
period has been characterized as a "good delay" since it insures that 
permits will not be hastily granted without due consideration being 
given to relevant factors.179 The solicitation of divergent public opin-
ion should decrease the probability that detrimental effects from 
the granting of such permits will go unnoticed. Delays of longer than 
42 days have been the object of the most criticism, and can lead to 
an accumulation of animals awaiting processing. In October of 1974, 
40 tiger cubs were awaiting clearance for trade or purchase, alleg-
edly due to bureaucratic delays. 180 
Delays in the administration of the permit system have resulted 
in actions which work contrary to the intent of the Act. Due to the 
difficulty of obtaining specimens from other sources, some zoos have 
been forced to in-breed animal families, leading to a higher percen-
tage of defective or diseased offspring. 181 Zoos which have fulfilled 
their own needs with respect to an endangered species may separate 
their breeders and prevent future propagation if the delays con-
tinue. 182 Otherwise, such facilities will become overcrowded while 
waiting to see if permits for sale or trade of such animals will be 
granted. It is illogical for a zoo to continue to propagate a species 
once its facilities are full, if it cannot be assured that it will be 
allowed to distribute surplus animals to other facilities. The dis-
couragement of breeding is directly contrary to the intended pur-
pose of the Act which is to ". . . encourage zoos to pool their stocks 
of endangered species into cooperative breeding programs in the 
hopes of providing some of the legitimate zoo and research needs for 
species from captive stock, rather than from wild populations."183 
Some increases in breeding programs have admittedly taken place 
because of the 1973 Act. The Bronx Zoo, for example, bred 663 
animals during 1974, as compared with 185 purchased from other 
zoos or animal dealers.184 
Delays in acting on permits have also resulted in the maintenance 
of endangered animals in inadequate or overcrowded facilities. The 
experience of the Brookfield Zoo in Illinois illustrates how delays 
can force animals to live in less than adequate facilities. 185 The zoo 
received five Nile crocodiles from the United States government 
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which had confiscated them from parties who had taken them in 
violation of law. Although the animals remained the property of the 
government, the zoo was issued a permit to possess them on April 
24, 1973. The permit contained a provision prohibiting the zoo from 
transferring or selling the animals or their progeny without the per-
mission of the Department of the Interior. As the animals began to 
outgrow their facilities at the Brookfield Zoo, a permit was re-
quested on December'12, 1973 for transfer of the animals to the 
Crandon Park Zoo in Miami. When this request went unanswered, 
a new request was made on March 19, 1974. The second letter was 
not answered, and a third request was sent on August 16, 1974, After 
some disagreement as to whether a permit was actually needed for 
the transfer, authorization was finally given at the end of Septem-
ber, 1974. Almost ten months had gone by since the zoo first re-
quested a transfer. During the delay, the animals continued to grow 
and continued to be maintained in overcrowded facilities in the zoo. 
Although the 1973 Act was eventually held inapplicable to the situa-
tion, its possible application played a role in the delay. Addition-
ally, the permit procedures involved in this example were adminis-
tered through the same department which handles endangered 
species permits and is therefore demonstrative of the difficulties 
which can be encountered when administering such a system. De-
lays of this magnitude may discourage zoos from breeding endan-
gered animals, especially if their facilities are only adequate for 
maintaining such animals for a short time or while they are very 
small. With no assurances that they will be able to dispose of such 
animals for several months, the incentive to breed them is dimin-
ished. 
One major reason for the delays which have occurred in the issu-
ance of permits has been the lack of preparation time provided for 
the establishment of a permit system. The Act became effective 
immediately upon being signed into law, and permits for engaging 
in otherwise prohibited acts were immediately required, even 
though permit procedures had not yet been established. Even the 
Office of Endangered Species has admitted that the processing of 
some permits was "abominable", although they also claim that the 
delay problems have now been essentially corrected. 188 The accuracy 
of this contention is hard to ascertain since the Federal Register 
does not publish information concerning the disposition of permit 
applications, and such information is not readily available to the 
general public. '87 
Another factor causing delay in the processing of applications by 
the administrator, even after permit procedures have been estab-
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lished, is the requirement that every transaction involving an en-
dangered species must be approved in a separate permit. Even an 
institution with a superb reputation for aiding endangered species 
must go through the entire permit process before engaging in any 
activity covered by the permit system. No short cuts are allowed, 
even for an institution with a proven record of protecting endan-
gered species. 
D. Proposed Solutions 
One possible solution to reduce delays in receiving a permit is 
available within the framework of the statute as it is now written. 
Section lOa of the Act allows the Secretary to permit, under condi-
tions and terms prescribed by him, acts which are otherwise prohib-
ited, for scientific or propagational purposes,188 Nothing in this sec-
tion requires that a separate permit be issued for each transaction 
involving an endangered species, although the present permit sys-
tem is based on that principle. A feasible alternative would be to 
issue temporal permits, perhaps valid for one year at a time, to 
organizations that could demonstrate: (1) good faith attempts to 
help endangered species; and (2) non-involvement in any transac-
tions which have injuriously affected the survival of endangered 
species. lSI A suggested method of implementing such a system is 
through a bill now pending in the House of Representatives which 
would establish a Zoo Accreditation Board.llo The duties of this 
board would include the establishment of standards of operations 
for zoological institutions, and the certification of zoos which com-
plied with such standards. III This bill could be modified so that 
certification by the Board would give the institution so certified an 
exemption from the permit requirements of the 1973 Act. The stan-
dards guiding the accreditation process would have to be written so 
as to take into consideration the institution's past dealings with 
endangered species and its ability to possess and handle such ani-
mals without detrimental effect. Certification of an institution 
would presuppose that it would act in good faith to protect endan-
gered species, at least until the institution acted in such a way as 
to rebut that presumption. The exemptions allowed to the institu-
tions could be restricted, perhaps including only transactions in-
volving animals which are already held in captivity within the coun-
try, while still requiring permits for the importation or removal from 
the wild of endangered species. A zoological institution would be 
deterred from conducting activities which might endanger a species, 
since such activities would strip the zoo of its accreditation and 
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might also give the government the power to compel the zoo to cease 
operation. 192 
Another way of accomplishing the same objective might be 
through industry self-regulation, rather than through government 
control.193An organization like the American Association of Zoologi-
cal Parks and Aquariums194 could establish guidelines for the protec-
tion of endangered species, with each member institution that com-
plied with such standards being eligible to obtain a blanket permit 
valid for a specified time period. Regulations establishing such a 
system should include a provision allowing the government to over-
see its operation, and to step in if the guidelines were inadequate 
or not being enforced. The major argument against this proposal is 
that zoological institutions may be subject to a potential conflict of 
interest in attempting to preserve endangered species in the wild, 
while also attempting to maintain adequate exhibits of animals in 
captivity. Another criticism of this proposal is that government su-
pervision might become so excessive as to be even less efficient than 
direct control by the government. 
The Department of the Interior has proposed new regulations 
which might also result in fewer delays in obtaining permits.195 Cer-
tain species of animals, particularly certain cats, would be desig-
nated "threatened species" rather than "endangered species," if 
already held in captivity in the United States. Animals would be so 
designated once they were determined to be a "captive self-
sustaining population"198 (i.e., that sufficient breeding programs are 
being carried out to assure that the species will continue to exist in 
captivity, even though transactions involving such animals are 
permitted). The implementation of such regulations would encour-
age zoos to increase breeding programs. Once animals were being 
bred in sufficient numbers to be designated "self-sustaining", con-
trols over such animals could theoretically be removed, and the zoos 
could more easily transfer such animals from one institution to an-
other. The legal basis for distinguishing between animals of a given 
species held in captivity in the United States and animals of the 
same species in the wild is found in the definition of "species" 
contained in the 1973 Act. 197 A "species" is defined to include". . . 
any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants and any other group of 
fish or wildlife of the same species or smaller taxa in common spatial 
arrangement that interbreed when mature."198 The use of the phrase 
"common spatial arrangement" has been advanced as a legal justifi-
cation for classifying an endangered species within the United 
States differently from the same species in a foreign country.199 The 
movement of a species from the "endangered" list to the "threat-
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ened" list is important because less restrictive controls could then 
be applied to transactions in such animals. The 1973 Act specifically 
sets out controls for endangered species, and also provides that the 
Secretary can issue whatever regulations he considers necessary and 
advisable for the protection of threatened species.20o Therefore, this 
proposed regulation could be implemented within the present statu-
tory framework. 
E. Judicial Construction 
The 1973 Act has been construed by one court to restrict the 
activities in which an individual can engage on his own property, if 
such actions will affect, even indirectly, the survival of an endan-
gered species. In U.S. u. Cappaert,201 the United States sought a 
declaratory judgment of its rights to the use of water appurtenant 
to land in Death Valley National Monument, necessary to maintain 
a pool for the desert pupfish (an endangered species). The evidence 
established that the defendants' pumping of underground water for 
commercial purposes had drawn water from underground sources 
which supplied the pool, threatening the survival of the pupfish. 
The court issued an injunction restraining adjacent landowners 
from pumping underground water from their land, except as was 
necessary for domestic purposes. The court recognized a public in-
terest in the preservation of the pupfish and declared that the water 
rights of the United States were superior in time and right to those 
of the private landowners. In addition, the court found that the 
United States would have no adequate remedy at law in the event 
that the pupfish were rendered extinct by the pumping. Therefore 
the defendants were enjoined so as to limit their pumping to achieve 
and maintain a stated daily mean water level in the pool. 
The significance of this case is the importance which was at-
tached to the protection of an endangered species, ranking it supe-
rior to private property rights. The case also illustrates the use of 
equitable powers by a court in effectively contributing to the sur-
vival of an endangered species. The court rlid not address the ques-
tion of whether the same results would have been obtained had the 
pool whose sources were being drained been located on private land, 
rather than in a national park. However, such an extension would 
seem warranted by the opinion, since the court recognized a na-
tional interest in protecting endangered species in general, and not 
merely in protecting endangered species located on federal property. 
Such a conclusion would also support the clearly expressed federal 
policy of protecting endangered species through the preservation of 
their natural habitat. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Protection for endangered species has become increasingly com-
prehensive over the years. The 1973 Act regulates virtually all trans-
actions involving endangered species, with exceptions allowed when 
considered appropriate. This all-encompassing authority has led to 
the administrative difficulties described above. A streamlining of 
the permit system is needed. This can be accomplished by either (1) 
allowing blanket permits for reputable organizations, or (2) impos-
ing less restrictive controls on animals held in captivity. The exemp-
tions contained in the 1973' Act are inconsistent. Differentiation 
between animals in captivity and their progeny is unnecessary and 
should be eliminated. The distinction between commercial and non-
commercial transactions should be modified. The present distinc-
tion is too simplistic, and therefore unworkable. The degree ofregu-
lation imposed should be based on the potential harm or good which 
might result from a given transaction involving an endangered spec-
ies, rather than simply on whether monetary considerations are in-
volved. Protection of endangered species is vital for the general 
welfare of the public, but such protection should not be based on 
the premise that more regulation necessarily leads to more effective 
protection. 
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